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The Legacy of COVID-19: Revivifying the Socratic Method for the Benefit of Legal Education in Civil Law Countries

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Abstract: A crisis marks a turning point for an entire society or a social subsystem by challenging old but not yet abandoned conceptions. In civil law countries, the infectious disease COVID-19 has led to a crisis in legal education. Despite many technological developments in society over the last few decades (e.g., digitalization, the development of the Internet, the rise of artificial intelligence), the legal education system has been remarkably sluggish and has barely adapted to these changes. The COVID-19 pandemic, however, has shaken legal education to its foundations, as it has directly affected teaching methods by distancing the deliverers of know-how from its recipients. As this paper suggests, this has ultimately altered the aim of legal education and the content that is taught, moving away from an education model focused mainly on knowledge acquisition to one in which the processing of a large amount of information, critical thinking and analytical skills are quintessential. Revivifying the Socratic method of teaching plays a significant role in this new educational model and is crucial in today's world of ever-changing social environments and laws. This method can nurture people with a legal education who are able to understand, apply, and further develop the body of law to a high quality. This paper proposes an adaptable model for future legal education in civil law countries focusing on the understanding of the legal system from a holistic perspective rather than on the reproduction of memorized knowledge.

Keywords: Covid-19, legal education, Socratic method, rote learning

Introduction

The infectious disease COVID-19 not only has a devastating effect on people's health, but the pandemic also impacts many aspects of societies around the world, especially their economies (United Nations Sustainable Development Group 2020, 3). In spring 2020, with law schools shutting down their campuses and cancelling classes or moving them online, concerns were increasingly expressed—online or during conferences—that legal education was facing a (new[1]) crisis (e.g., Chakrabarti 2020).

The most intuitive way to handle a crisis is to fight back, i.e., to tackle the triggering event to return to the status quo and fix the damage caused. However, an alternative way to respond to a crisis is, as a first step, to identify the immediate impact of the crisis and to understand why the event challenges the existing system. As a second step, the conceptions or values identified as being challenged by the event would need to come under scrutiny and, if necessary, be revised or abandoned.

Focusing on that second approach, this paper first analyzes in its second section the impact of COVID-19 on legal education in civil law countries. It stresses that one of the most evident and pivotal consequences of methods

[1] This is not the first time that legal education has been spoken of as being in crisis. Summarizing all papers that elaborate on such crises would undoubtedly go beyond the confines of this paper, but a few examples shall nonetheless be mentioned: Julius Cohen, for example, detected in 1948 signs of a crisis in American legal education stemming from criticism of the values taught by law schools (Cohen 1948). Cohen identified a "general revolt against the arid conceptualism of an earlier jurisprudence, which stressed the logical consistency of self-contained rules of law without considering either their social origins or social consequences" (Cohen 1948, 588). In December 1968, Gottfried T. W. Dietzel summarized several speeches delivered at a meeting of the German Protestant Academy Loccum calling for the reform of German legal education (Dietzel 1968, 72–74). A certain professor Roxin was reported to have argued that the teaching method of the time forestalled students from developing an interest in meta-judicial context and methodical aspects (Dietzel 1968, 73), a critique revived in Section 3 of this paper. At around the same time, Alon A. Stone discussed what he called the "crisis of values in legal education" and asserted that there is a "chronic chorus of dissatisfaction with legal education" (Stone 1971, 392). Another example is Patrick McAuslan, who emphatically urged action in view of the "crisis looming in [England's] legal education" (McAuslan 1989, 310). He went on to state—rightly so, in the author's view—that more emphasis should be put on "context and skill learning at the expense of rote learning of the law" (McAuslan 1989, 316). In 2002, Andrew Moore reported that "[l]egal education has a bad reputation these days" (A. Moore 2003, 505). More recently, Gesine Güldemund, Nina Keller, Ulrike Schillinger and Christin Veltjens-Rösch argued that the need for reforms of the legal education is not only a permanent topic of jurisprudence but also enriches jurisprudence as it leads to healthy and enduring self-reflection (Güldemund et al. 2012, 244–46) (see in this regard the thoughts of Wang Tangjia and Melvin Rader on the stimulating effects of a crisis (Wang 2014, 262; Rader 1947, 266–74)). Finally, James G. Milles wrote that legal education in the United States faces both an economic crisis and a crisis of confidence, which will eventually lead to the dismantlement of law libraries (Milles 2014).

to curb the spread of the disease is the distance created between the deliverers of know-how and its recipients. The third section identifies four conceptions of legal education that have been challenged by the COVID-19 situation and calls them into question, especially the idea that the ultimate (if not the one and only) goal of legal education in civil law countries is to teach students to know[2] the law. The succeeding section calls for a change in the existing framework of legal education by proposing a model based on the Socratic method of teaching, under which the processing of a large amount of information, critical thinking and analytical skills are crucial, and deep thinking[3] is encouraged. This paper closes with the fifth and last section expressing the hope that COVID-19, despite its horrendous effects on people's health, may eventually lead to a beneficial alteration of legal education in civil law countries.

2. The Immediate Impact of COVID-19 on Legal Education

COVID-19 first came to the attention of the (Asian) public in early January 2020. On January 26, 2020, Tsinghua University, one of China's most prestigious universities, announced that it would postpone the start of the new spring semester due to COVID-19 (Tsinghua University 2020). At around the same time, the campus was closed to students who lived outside. The university quickly arranged for online classes and started the new spring semester as scheduled on February 17, 2020 (Tsinghua University 2020).

[2] Having know-how (or knowledge) about something is different from understanding it (provided that this "something" is accessible to understanding at all [see Moravcsik 1979, 201–2]), although the minutiae of this difference (or differences) still seem to be contested (cf. Moravcsik 1979; Pritchard 2014; Reading 2011, 74–76). This paper follows Moravcsik's notion of "understanding," which states that "understanding [is] not […] a matter of merely having lots of information about a subject; rather, it consists of seeing larger complexes, with their ingredients interrelated in the proper way" (Moravcsik 1979, 210). Hence, to improve a person's understanding, that person's "ability to interrelate material, and to see larger connections between parts of the information supplied" has to be targeted (Moravcsik 1979, 210).

[3] The concept of "deep thinking" was introduced by William Byers, who did not present a formal definition of the term (Byers 2015, 1). Instead, Byers introduced "salient features" of what he thought constitutes deep thinking (Byers 2015, 17–19). Bearing in mind these features, one may describe deep thinking as a natural but difficult process which is kicked off by facing a problem of some sort during which "the known and the certain" are being abandoned, and proven patterns of thought are discontinued while the problem is looked at "in an entirely new way," thereby creating a new conceptual system of increased complexity (Byers 2015, 17–19). Deep thinking is different from logical or algorithmic thinking, as it embodies creativity and thus allows the thinker to step outside the box (see Byers 2015, 105; see Rogers 1993, 114).

As the virus became more widespread, universities on the European continent were forced to react too. The Faculty of Law of the German university Rheinische Friedrich-Wilhelms-Universität Bonn, for example, began to offer online lectures on April 20, 2020 (Rheinische Friedrich-Wilhelms-Universität Bonn 2020b). In addition, the university announced that the Faculty of Law's central library would remain closed until further notice, and to compensate for the closure, online access to databases, ejournals and ebooks would be expanded (Rheinische Friedrich-Wilhelms-Universität Bonn 2020b). In-person exams were replaced by online oral or written examinations (Rheinische Friedrich-Wilhelms-Universität Bonn 2020a, 8). Other universities, such as Switzerland's University of Zurich (interview with Gabriele Siegert, 2020, March 1; Fuchs 2020) and University of St. Gallen (Universität St.Gallen 2020), as well as Germany's University of Cologne (Universität zu Köln 2020a), adopted similar measures.

As the outbreak was controlled during the summer months, universities began to start offering a hybrid model (or "blended mode") of teaching for the autumn semester, allowing a limited number of students to attend classes in person while others participated online (e.g., Università di Bologna 2020; Rechtswissenschaftliche Fakultät der Universität Freiburg 2020). The urging of both universities and students to return to normality is glaring.

The measures taken by universities in civil law countries to curb COVID-19, as introduced above, had three "immediate" consequences: First, there was (and to a certain extent still is) no in-person education, as lectures were moved online. Second, access to campus facilities such as libraries was denied (and still remains partly restricted). Third, there were (and to some extent still are) no in-person exams, as these were replaced by oral or written online examinations and term papers. Thus, the COVID-19 control measures affected the three main pillars of legal education, i.e., teaching, research and self-study, as well as examinations. *Ante* COVID-19, this "legal education triangle" was almost exclusively based on in-person interactions.[4] The measures to fight COVID-19, however, transformed the student experience from one of normally being present in lectures and socially engaged in campus life to studying from a distance, an experience formerly only known in the context of distance universities, which did not (and perhaps still do not) enjoy the best reputation. Hence, the COVID-19 measures distanced

[4] *Contra* apparently Lillian Corbin and Lisa Bugden, who seem to have identified an increasing trend worldwide in the use of technology for teaching law, without, however, referring to any examples (Corbin and Bugden 2018, 1).

the deliverers of know-how (universities) from its recipients (students) and reduced universities' control over students.[5]

The prevailing view that this circumstance constituted a crisis is quite remarkable considering that the technological developments of the last few decades (namely the rise of the Internet)[6] could in principle have allowed *in absentia* interactions (not to be confused with the absence of personal interaction) even earlier. In addition, legal education is highly independent from physical facilities (including libraries, if legal know-how has been digitized), contrasting with, say, the medical sciences or chemistry education, which not only require facilities such as university hospitals or laboratories but also necessitate work with physical materials such as human bodies or chemical substances. Thus, legal education has the potential to showcase the maximization of the opportunities offered by (new) technologies by shifting the legal education triangle to a combination of in-person and *in absentia* interactions.[7] This raises the question as to why COVID-19 has been seen as having triggered a crisis in legal education, or put differently, why legal education remains so dependent on the existing in-person focused legal education triangle.

3. The In-Person Focused Legal Education Triangle

3.1. The Main Aim of Legal Education is to Teach Students to Know the Law

Before the different aspects of the legal education triangle are being discussed, the aim of legal education in civil law countries must be

[5] This reduced level of control is of particular importance as regards the examination of students' knowledge. See Section 3.4 in this regard.

[6] A recently published study that analysed 54 law faculties in Austria, Germany and Switzerland in terms of the integration of legal tech (understood as technologies supporting the structuring and execution of private legal relationships, dispute resolution as well as law-making and the exercise of state sovereign rights [Anzinger 2020, 1–2]) into the academic curriculum found that none of the faculties offered compulsory lectures related to data science nor legal technology. Some faculties, however, offered seminars and other extra-curricular programs such as the LegalTechLabCologne, a group dedicated to legal technology topics initiated by the German University of Cologne (Anzinger 2020, 26–30; Universität zu Köln 2020b).

[7] This is not to say that the digitalization or Internetisation of legal education would be a straightforward task. On the contrary, the "[s]uccessful integration of technologies is not as simple as it may appear from the first glance" (Trepule, Tereseviciene, and Rutkiene 2015, 849). It not only requires educators to have a corresponding mindset (Trepule, Tereseviciene, and Rutkiene 2015, 850) but also creates challenges for the information technology infrastructure.

understood.[8] The question may appear to be fatuous, but the answer is not as simple as it seems. Although one might expect that universities, as the main supplier of legal education, would provide a suitable answer to this question, in most cases, they do not (see the appended Table 1;[9] see also Goldring 1997, 45). The majority of academic regulations analyzed in this paper either do not state the goal of legal education at all or stipulate a rather superficial aim such as teaching methodical and professional knowledge (with the exception of the University of Cologne, Humboldt University of Berlin and Paris Lodron University of Salzburg). Based on the analysis of the selected study plans (e.g., Universität Luzern 2016; Rechtswissenschaftliche Fakultät Universität Zürich 2020; Juristische Fakultät der Universität Basel 2020; Juristische Fakultät der Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin 2015b), it is fair to say that the main goal of legal education is for students to acquire knowledge of legal provisions in various legal fields, such as civil, criminal, public, civil procedure, commercial, and corporate law. Hence, the present aim of legal education is to teach the students to know the law (see Vanistendael and Reich 2002, 271; see Gersen 2016, 2323). Memorizing legal provisions is, therefore, an important part of the learning process.

3.2. Law Is Taught in an In-Person Setting

Universities have always been known for their landmark buildings (e.g., the University of Zurich, the University of Lucerne, Heidelberg University, the University of Bucharest, Moscow State University, Aarhus University, Uppsala University). Universities function as anchor institutions (Goddard 2018, 356–57). When they first emerged,[10] students physically went to university spaces—in some cases, private houses or rented rooms (Bott 2018)—to acquire knowledge (cf. Harold Perkin 2007, 162). "The standard method of instruction […] consisted of listening to lectures on the prescribed texts and listening to and participating in disputations" (J. C. Moore 2018, 20). This standard teaching method continues to be reflected in the term "lecture," stemming from the medieval Latin term *lectura*, which meant "a reading" (Online Etymologie Dictionary 2020). The German term *Vorlesung*—derived from the stem of the verb *vorlesen*, meaning to read something aloud—also indicates this mode of *ex-cathedra* teaching, not to

[8] This paper solely discusses the goal of legal education at the Bachelor's and Master's levels; it does not look at the aims pursued within Ph.D. or doctoral programs.

[9] For the purpose of this paper, the study regulations of all Swiss universities offering legal education as well as a random sample of German, French, Austrian and Dutch universities were analysed.

[10] It is assumed that the Western university tradition dates back to the twelfth century (J. C. Moore 2018, 16).

be confounded with "direct instruction" (cf. Martin Wellenreuther 2016; Slocum 2004). Practiced during medieval times, this *ex-cathedra* teaching method was based on the medieval understanding of knowledge in which truth was seen to be contained in the holy and pagan writings (Fend 2007, 86). It was not necessary to conduct discourses to find the truth; the truth was there (Fend 2007, 86). Many law faculties in civil law jurisdictions have, as far as can be seen, retained the style of *ex-cathedra* teaching or teacher-centered learning.[11] Considering Helmut Fend's abovementioned finding, this is not particularly surprising, given that in civil law countries, the truth—i.e., the law—is there. The law exists; it is given, primarily made by legislators through the enactment of substantive laws (and secondarily by the courts through judicial precedents).[12] In civil law countries, the focus lies on the application of the law (see e.g., Müller 1969, 224; Vanistendael and Reich 2002, 271). This might appear an obvious assertion, but it is crucial to understand why legal education in civil law countries, compared with that in case law jurisdictions, is less focused on discussing and scrutinizing the body of law and its rationale.

As far as can be seen, only very few and widely unknown institutions offer full online bachelor's and master's degrees (e.g., Arden University, University of Essex Online, The University of Law, The Open University). Why legal education did not move online prior to the COVID-19 pandemic on a broader scale is not fully comprehensible, however. A teaching style that is mainly teacher-centered and does not require much student engagement is considerably simple to implement in an online setting. An example is as follows: A lecture on the basics of non-contractual liability (with only a few questions directly addressed to students) can easily be conducted online, but this approach poses two challenges. First, it is difficult for the professor to see the students' reactions to her or his lecture and to get a feeling of the overall classroom atmosphere. Second, the lecture might be recorded by the students or the university itself, a practice that some professors and students, in fear of making a wrong statement, might not support. Another possible reason is the general sluggishness of law faculties in adapting to new developments.[13] The value placed on tradition might have played an

[11] The *ex-cathedra* teaching model has also been described as the "traditional classroom model" (e.g., Pengelley 2001, 615).

[12] As opposed to case law jurisdictions where the law is made by the courts on a case-by-case decision (in accordance with the *stare decisis* doctrine and subject to existing substantive law).

[13] It seems that not much has changed since Nicholas Pengelley wrote in 2001 that "the uncertainty [with regard to law libraries] is largely driven by the potential advent of Web-based learning, and the as yet largely undeveloped nature of the law school response to the possibilities of education outside of the traditional classroom model" (Pengelley 2001, 615).

important role in retaining a paradigm of teaching law in an in-person setting. It is interesting to note that given the teacher-centeredness of legal education, COVID-19 has not, in theory, had much effect on its dominant teaching method, because it does not make a huge difference whether a lecture is held off- or online.

3.3. Legal Knowledge Has to Be Accessed Primarily on Campus

The paradigm that legal knowledge has to be accessed primarily on campus consists of two aspects: how the teaching of legal knowledge is delivered (see Section 3.2) and how study materials are provided.

Prior to COVID-19, very few universities in civil law countries offered online courses. Lectures and seminars were mainly conducted in person in the universities' facilities. Without committing explicitly to the aforementioned paradigm, universities seem to have been reluctant to provide legal knowledge outside the campus context (see Section 3.2).

A similar picture can be observed regarding the second aspect mentioned above. In 1949, Russel N. Sullivan wrote that "all law teachers would agree that every law school should have a satisfactory library […]" (Sullivan 1949, 154; cf. Roalfe 1938, 337; cf. Beardsley 1925, 93). He concluded his paper on "an adequate law school library" by stating that "a lawyer cannot be prepared for practice without a good library in which he [or she] does some independent study" (Sullivan 1949, 157; cf. Roalfe 1958, 346). Jurisprudence is all about "thoughts." The body of law is the product of a society's thoughts on how to regulate various social interactions (cf. Bleckmann 2016, 308, with further references). Before the advent of the Internet and the digitalization age, these thoughts had to be "stored" and made accessible in a physical place to share them with students. Hence, legal knowledge had to be accessed primarily on campus.[14]

In 1949, digitalization was still unknown. Nowadays, however, "most of the major research resources […] students and researchers are likely to require are, or will be, Web-based" (Pengelley 2001, 624). Indeed, the Swiss constitution, Swiss federal laws, and ordinances issued by both the Swiss parliament and the Swiss Federal Council are, among others, accessible through an online platform (Swiss Publications Act of June 18, 2004, SR 170.512, article 1a para. 1). To make sure that one consults the piece of legislation currently in force at the time of research, one has to consult the corresponding online platform and not a printed version stored at a law library. It is a truism that the digitalization age should in principle make

[14] See for a history of law library design in this regard Peoples 2014, 612–16.

all(!) legal knowledge accessible from any place on earth that has a sufficient Internet connection at any time to anybody.[15] The reality, however, is somewhat different. In 2001, Nicholas Pengelley was not sure whether "there [would] be any books in the law library of 2021" (Pengelley 2001, 626). As is known today, he was overly optimistic. Law libraries still store books and even "hedge their bets for as long as possible and continue to subscribe both to the print and electronic versions of law reports, legislation and journal series" (Pengelley 2001, 628). However, there is, in the author's opinion, an important distinction to be made. On the one hand, a huge volume of journal publications is already available online through various research platforms, such as Swisslex, Beck-Online, HeinOnline, Westlaw, LexisNexis and JSTOR (cf. Pengelley 2001, 626).[16] On the other hand, the number of books and monographs available online is still small; this may be due to the financial interests of the publishers (and in some cases, the authors).[17] Therefore, assuming that students cannot or do not buy all necessary books for their research and studies, some parts of legal knowledge (conveyed through the medium of the book or the monograph) are still only accessible on campus.

Although the Internet and digitalization are omnipresent today, law faculties remain attached to erecting landmark buildings to house their law libraries (e.g., the Zurich law library, the Tsinghua law library, the Squire law library, the library of the Catholic University in Ružomberok). The present strategies of law libraries are nebulous. Only a few of the law libraries of the universities listed in the appended Table 1 have publicly disclosed their mission or strategy. The missions that are published reflect a commitment to the traditional understanding of a library as being the node point for the provision of information (Leiden University 2020; Bibliothèques Universitaires Université Savoie Mont Blanc 2020; Universitätsbibliothek der Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin 2020).[18] "Traditional" law libraries (sponsored with taxpayers' money) have, however, missed the chance to maintain their role as "collection builders" in the online environment (seemingly contra Pengelley 2001, 636). The leading online research

[15] The question of whether legal knowledge should be made available free of charge must be left to future research, due to the confines of this paper.

[16] This development has posed a lot of challenges in particular for law reviews and publishers, and will continue to do so (see e.g., Most 2002, 192–206).

[17] Pengelley made the development in this regard subject to the development of screen technology (Pengelley 2001, 626).

[18] The libraries of the Université Savoie Mont Blanc published the mission of the so-called "Joint University Documentation and Library Service" outlining its tasks, which also mentions the development of "digital documentary resources" but does not sketch a general strategy (Bibliothèques Universitaires Université Savoie Mont Blanc, n.d.).

platforms (see above), which took on the role of "collection builders," are nowadays privately held.

A few libraries seem to have realized that they have to market their (in most cases generous) space as a location for personal interactions (Leiden University 2020; Universitätsbibliothek der Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin 2020). Although this objective still appears to be of subordinate importance, the author believes that it will become the main role of libraries in the future. They will mostly be public working and collaboration spaces (see Pengelley 2001, 639–40; Haugen 2005, 476; Peoples 2014, 622).[19] The objective of providing knowledge will fade into the background as knowledge repositories move online.

Although the Internet age and the trend of digitalization have not left law libraries untouched, prior to the COVID-19 pandemic, the legal scholarship for the most part adhered to the paradigm that legal knowledge had to be accessed primarily on campus. The reasons for this are not fully comprehensible. This approach could again have been driven by tradition. Another possibility is that universities were inclined to maintain their physical presence and spatial dominance as an expression of their social significance through landmark buildings that stored the universities' knowledge. COVID-19 has certainly challenged this assumption, as it has resulted in the closure of many law libraries, consequently threatening the research and study activities of law students. Universities have had to expand online access to databases, ejournals and ebooks (Rheinische Friedrich-Wilhelms-Universität Bonn 2020b). Suddenly, the accessibility of knowledge at the universities' facilities has become even less important than it was before.

3.4. The Performance of Law Students is to be Assessed by In-Person Exams

"The strongest single factor affecting the way students learn any subject at University is the way they are assessed" (Goldring 1997, 41; see Zander 1968, 24; see Bleckmann 2016, 306). As Frank Bleckmann pointed out, the core issue is that the exam must be decidedly functionalized for the subject matter, as otherwise the subject matter would be functionalized by the exam, making the subject matter arbitrarily exchangeable (Bleckmann 2016, 306).

[19] In this context, Pengelley stressed the need to "drop [the library's] out-dated and outmoded taboos and turn our libraries into places that people will still want to come to – before they do not want to come any longer" (Pengelley 2001, 637). It appears that William R. Roalfe's witticism that "the quite general belief that the words 'library' and 'books' are virtually synonymous is one of the important misconceptions about the law school libraries" will become more true in the future (Roalfe 1938, 336).

The teaching method and the examination thus need to be constructively aligned with the subject matter and divided into learning goals (Bleckmann 2016, 306; cf. Goldring 1997, 55). Applied to the present context, this means that exams conducted as part of legal education need to be aligned with the aims of legal education. Currently, the overarching aim, as discussed above,[20] is to teach students to know the law. Accordingly, the hypothesis is that most universities today use examination methods focused on objective methods (i.e., written and oral exams with multiple choice questions, true or false questions or questions requiring short answers), and hence accentuate the importance of memorizing legal knowledge.[21]

The studied examination regulations of various European universities all list written and oral exams as examination methods (see the appended Table 2). Written works also compose part of the examination curriculum, although these are in most cases limited to Bachelor's or Master's theses. Some of the universities also list alternative examination methods, such as oral presentations, seminars, and moot courts. However, the author's own experiences in Switzerland and China, other legal scholars' accounts, and the formulation of the respective examination regulations permit the supposition that in-person written and oral exams (the latter of which are conducted mostly at the Master's level) are predominant (Accord Braun 2000, 242; Dagilyte and Coe 2019, 111; see Craven-Griffiths 1984, 114). This makes sense insofar as exams need to be aligned with the educational goal (Bleckmann 2016, 306; cf. Goldring 1997, 55), which in civil law countries' legal education is still focused on the memorization of legal knowledge.[22] In this sense, the current examination methods fulfill their purpose.

However, these classical assessment methods are not unproblematic. "Much traditional legal education, which was little more than training to pass final examinations, meant that much of what was learned was forgotten, let alone understood" (Goldring 1997, 48; cf. Motley 1985, 737; Zander 1968, 32–33). Traditional examination methods encourage "surface approaches" (Rogers 1993, 123) and have the effect that the students do not acquire a deep understanding of content, but instead blindly reproduce what they have learned by rote. "The objective becomes learning the rules, not how lawyers think and act" (Motley 1985, 733).

COVID-19 has shaken the paradigm that students' performance has to be predominantly assessed by in-person (written or oral) exams. Suddenly,

[20] See Section 3.1.

[21] For a detailed discussion of objective methods, see Mendelson 1972, 316–19.

[22] Cf. Maurice Mendelson's report that a committee of the Laws Faculty Board of King's College, London, found that the traditional examination method "places excessive emphasis on short-term memory" (Mendelson 1972, 315).

universities have not been able to call students in for written or oral exams. Rather, students' performance has had to be assessed remotely. Consequently, term papers have become an increasingly preferred method of assessment. The advantage of assessment through term papers is that it is more reflective of the reality of a jurist's work today (regardless of whether she or he is a professor, judge, prosecutor, or lawyer).[23] The memorization of legal knowledge has taken a back seat. Instead, legal reasoning, analysis, critical thinking, and the expression of one's own thoughts have come to the fore, all of which are in the author's view essential skills of a good jurist.[24] The difficulty is that students have not, or not sufficiently, been taught these skills.

4. The Emergence of a New Education Model Revivifying the Socratic Method

As shown above, COVID-19 has affected the traditional legal education triangle and caused in civil law countries what many consider to be a legal education crisis. By destabilizing some of the traditional paradigms of legal education, COVID-19 has given cause to reconsider legal education in civil law countries, and, in particular the aim of such education.

4.1. Limits of Nowadays' Legal Education

Students who were used to writing exams or taking part in *viva voce* exams suddenly have had to hand in several term papers as substitutes. Many of them have discovered that a term paper, subject of course to the respective task, requires more than mere knowledge of the applicable laws and regulations and their application to a case with crystal clear facts (a circumstance which one can hardly find in practice).[25] Writing a good article (or term paper) about a subject requires the ability to (i) deal with a large amount of information (i.e., scholarly works, precedents etc.), (ii) analyze a specific circumstance, (iii) understand the overall context into which the subject matter is embedded, (iv) critically think through existing theories (cf. Kissam 1987, 136, 141), and, if necessary, (v) reconsider well-tried theories, as well as (vi) express, as precisely as possible, one's own thoughts (see

[23] For a critical analysis with regard to term papers as an examination method, see Craven-Griffiths 1984, 106–7.

[24] See Section 4 for the nature of a good jurist.

[25] Unfortunately, there is no evidence at hand to support this proposition, which makes this paper more of an essay than a research article. If this is required to support the conveyance of this paper's key message about the revision necessary to our current legal education's short-sighted aim, then this sacrifice is gladly made.

Goldring 1997, 64). These are not easy tasks, and they will never be. The problem, in the author's view, is that students are not taught these skills, as the current aim of legal education that underpins the legal education triangle is misplaced. This is not to say that teaching legal knowledge, understood as knowledge of individual legislative acts and corresponding judicial precedents, is wrong or should not be one of the aims of legal education. On the contrary, it is crucial for students to have a profound understanding of the basics of the legal system (cf. Müller 1969, 225). The strong focus on almost exclusively teaching legal knowledge is, however, problematic.

It is difficult to find the exact numbers of laws and ordinances in force in, for example, Austria, the European Union (EU), Germany or Switzerland. JUSLINE, a provider of full texts of the most important Austrian laws, counts 1,201 laws in its database (summing up to 59,683 articles or paragraphs) (ADVOKAT Unternehmensberatung Greiter & Greiter GmbH 2020). In Switzerland, according to official numbers, 34 laws and ordinances were enacted or revised (including editorially revised decrees) during the last 30 days prior to September 21, 2020 (Bundesrat der Schweizerischen Eidgenossenschaft 2020). In the EU, a total of 14 legislative acts were adopted and another 16 legislative acts were amended between January and September 2020 (Publications Office of the European Union 2020). In addition, a total of 126 other legislative acts (council regulations, council directives and council decisions) were adopted and 76 existing legislative acts were amended (Publications Office of the European Union 2020). In 2019, the lower house of the German parliament, the *Bundestag*, passed 127 laws (Deutscher Bundestag 2020).

These numbers allow two conclusions. First, there is a huge number of legislative acts. Second, the legal body constantly changes (due either to the enactment of new legislative acts or to the revision thereof). Moreover, the body of law not only changes due to legislators' activities, but also undergoes constant development by the courts. In 2019, for example, the Swiss Federal Supreme Court issued a total of 211 leading cases covering various legal fields (Schweizerisches Bundesgericht 2020). This has the following seminal consequences for legal education: students cannot be taught the whole body of the law, and it is highly inefficient to try to teach them the whole body of law, as it is subject to rapid changes. Julius von Kirchman's widely cited *bon mot* that three correcting words of the legislator are sufficient to turn whole libraries into wastepaper (von Kirchmann 1973, 25) suitably depicts how the ever-changing nature of the body of law impacts legal science or jurisprudence. Legal technology has already accelerated and will further accelerate the loss of value of legal knowledge, mere knowledge reproducing activities and repetitive processes (Anzinger 2020, 1). Since

educating students in the whole body of law is both unviable and inefficient, what then should be the aim of legal education?

4.2. The New Aim of Legal Education: Imparting a Deep Understanding of the Social Contract and the Legal System

Three immediate answers can be given in response to this question. It can be argued that first, the scope of the body of law that is taught should be limited to basic research subjects. Second, education should focus on the framework that surrounds the subject matter, i.e., the seminal ideas and logical and methodical thinking around it. Third, legal education should implement a mixture of the first and second solutions. These three answers, however, do not stipulate the true aims of legal education. Rather, these answers are very much "delivery"-oriented, i.e., focused on what and how legal knowledge can be taught to students. Hence, there needs to be a "higher" goal of legal education, considering the role of educated jurists in the societal system (accord Müller 1969, 225). This leads to the questions of who jurists are and what role they play in society. The literature on the term "jurist" is scant, and it appears that the term lacks a definite meaning (Cotterrell 2013, 510). The definition provided in the Merriam-Webster dictionary, that a jurist is "one having a thorough knowledge of law" (Merriam-Webster 2020), is certainly not wrong, but it is too simplistic. In addition, the predication that jurists "deal with meanings of words" (Gizbert-Studnicki 1977, 161) is too abstract and thus does not carry any value. Müller emphasized that jurists apply the law (not blindly, but according to the rules of interpretation eventually leading to the development of the law), which is made by the legislator (Müller 1969, 224). In contrast, Cotterrell found that jurists are usually seen as legal scholars rather than lawyers (Cotterrell 2013, 510). Cotterrell proposed that:

> The role [of jurists] is that of maintaining the *idea of law* as a special kind of practice and enabling that idea to flourish. […] The jurist's focus could be said to be on law as a practical idea in general, or as embodied in the legal system (or type of legal system) which the jurist serves. The focus is on the worth of law, its *meaningfulness* as a social institution. (Cotterrell 2013, 511)

Müller's idea of a "jurist" is not satisfactory because it ignores the fact that many legally educated persons are involved in the making of law due to their service as members of legislative bodies. In the author's view, Cotterrell's interpretation also misses the point, as it suggests that being a jurist is a separate profession concerned with guarding the law (Cotterrell 2013, 511). Subsequently, however, Cotterrell seems to have proposed that the juristic

role is in fact more a question of who exercises juristic responsibility than a question of exercising a particular profession (Cotterrell 2013, 521). Although Cotterrell's understanding that jurists (should) serve the law is highly worth supporting, the author believes that he confused the notion of a jurist with the notion of a *good* jurist.

In the author's view, jurists are experts in interpreting the social contract (the foundation on which a democratic society is built)[26] and the legal system arising out of the social contract. The legal system comprises the law[27] and the respective enforcement systems (e.g., courts, bankruptcy offices). The legal system is, however, not a self-contained system (see with regard to this systematic approach Llompart 1970, 274–75; cf. Kecel 1952, 501). In contrast, it constantly interacts with other societal sub-systems (e.g., the political sub-system, the moral sub-system, the economic sub-system)[28] and adapts—sometimes quickly, sometimes more slowly—to changing environments and the expectations of the other sub-systems (see Goff 2012, 80–81; Waite 1887, 36; see Bleckmann 2016, 308–9). Any person having enjoyed an education in the social contract and the legal system is a jurist, be they a judge, a lawyer, a public prosecutor, a member of the parliament or a legal scholar. What then is a "good" jurist?

A good jurist, the author believes, is a jurist who has a deep understanding (and not mere knowledge)[29] of the social contract and the legal system. A good jurist understands the aim of the legal system (i.e., the regulation of the society), how it works and how it is influenced by other societal sub-systems (cf. Goldring 1997, 48). He or she has internalized both legal thinking and the idea of law, and thus acts as their guardian. To this effect, a good jurist assumes juristic responsibility as portrayed by Cotterrell (Cotterrell 2013, 512–20). That is, the jurist ensures that "the idea of law can survive in the socio-historic conditions it faces" (Cotterrell 2013, 520).

[26] This paper presumes that the origin of law and political order stems from the social contract. Due to the confines of this paper, however, social contract theory and the conflicting views on it cannot be elaborated in detail (see e.g., for an early elaboration on the theory Ritchie 1891).

[27] In this context, the term "law" is understood as describing the whole body of rules, customs and practices of a democratic community based on the social contract. Law is thus conceived by the respective community (see Llompart 1970, 274); it is the product of society's consensus on how to govern the various societal interactions (cf. Brown 1921, 129; Palmer 1936, 69). Rules that society believes are of particular importance and should be binding for all of its members and enforced accordingly become legal rules.

[28] This is probably the reason why Gerhard Kecel urged jurists to sharpen their political–legal sensorium (Kecel 1952, 501).

[29] See Fn. 2 in this regard.

Having clarified what a good jurist is, the answer to the question of what the aim of legal education should be is: "producing" good jurists, i.e., imparting a deep understanding of the social contract and the legal system.

4.3. On What Legal Education Should Teach

Against this backdrop, it is apparent that neither the first nor the second solution offered above as a reaction to the "problem" of an extremely large and ever-changing body of law is sufficient. In contrast, legal education should focus both on the seminal idea of law and legal thinking, as well as the core pillars of the concerned jurisdictions' bodies of law, i.e., private law, public law and criminal law. Hence, it is not sufficient for legal education to only—or mainly—focus on teaching individual acts and legal precedents. On the contrary, legal education needs to adopt a holistic approach and teach the basics of the social contract and the legal system, including how and why it interacts with other societal sub-systems. This requires students to be taught the political, historical, economic, and psychological aspects of society, a task that cannot and should not be merely delegated to grammar schools. In addition, legal education must provide students with the appropriate tools to "read" not only the body of law but also its interactions as a societal sub-system with other societal sub-systems (see Braun 2000, 242). These "tools" are the ability (i) to process a lot of information not only from the jurisdictional societal sub-system but also from other societal sub-systems (see Madison, III 2007, 310–12), (ii) to analyze a subject (be it a fact, an idea or theory, a social relationship, a political statement), (iii) to understand how the subject matter interacts with its environment and why it does so (see Madison, III 2007, 313–20), (iv) to think through the subject matter critically (cf. Kissam 1987, 141), and (v) to challenge it, if so required. Needless to say, legal education also needs to sharpen students' language skills.

4.4. Using the Socratic Method to Implement the New Aim of Legal Education

The question arises as to which teaching method can best support this new aim of legal education. The answer to this question is the Socratic method. The body of literature about the Socratic method (including numerous critiques of it) is extensive, and no full account thereof shall be given at this point.[30] For this paper's purpose, it is sufficient to recall the seminal idea of the Socratic method (ignoring all possible alterations of it). "[T]he objective

[30] Although it is a narrow selection of written works about the Socratic method, the interested reader is referred to the following works: Kerr 1999; A. Moore 2003; Beattie, JR. 2002; Madison, III 2007; Christie 2010; Abrams 2015; Gersen 2016; Delić and Bećirović 2016.

of the [Socratic] method is to force students to think actively about the issues that the law is trying to address" (A. Moore 2003, 506). Andrew Moore went on to state that "the point of the Socratic Method is to understand the conceptual framework of the law and its doctrines" (A. Moore 2003, 507). The fundamental idea of the Socratic method is to "provide participants with a method whereby they can give birth to their own ideas by their own devices" (Beattie, JR. 2002, 479; see Abrams 2015, 566; cf. Gersen 2016, 2324; Delić and Bećirović 2016, 512). The Socratic method can thus be described to foster deep thinking, a concept introduced by William Byers, which enables the "thinker" to step outside the box and come up with her or his own new thoughts (see Byers 2015, 105; see Rogers 1993, 114). In the context of legal education, this means that the Socratic method is not primarily concerned with the transfer of knowledge of individual laws and regulations but with the tools needed to understand the law. Understanding the law requires the ability (i) to analyze a subject matter, (ii) to understand how it interacts with its environment and why it does so, (iii) to reflect upon it and think it through with a critical mind, and (iv) to form one's own thoughts that might support or challenge existing paradigms and give rise to new, unprecedented ideas. (The attentive reader will by now have certainly discovered that these are the very same skills that a good jurist should have and that can be trained through legal writing, as outlined above.) The method of teaching these skills is to enter into an active discourse with students and to ask questions so that they can not only elicit knowledge they already possess but also "internalize the question process" (Beattie, JR. 2002, 480; see Delić and Bećirović 2016, 512). The Socratic method, from a holistic point of view, is all about actively engaging students with the subject matter, which is scarce in civil law countries' legal education. It is not done by simply asking a few questions in the course of a lecture (accord Beattie, JR. 2002, 482). Rather, students need to be heavily involved and acquire the learning content together with the law teacher. Active engagement with the study matter not only consists of active in-class dialogue (not limited to practice seminars where the application of the law to specific cases is taught), but also includes actively confronting a topic outside the classroom setting, such as through legal writing. Merely memorizing individual laws and regulations does not constitute active engagement. Therefore, if legal education in civil law jurisdictions, as proposed by this paper, revivifies the Socratic method, examination methods will also have to be changed.

Acknowledging all of the critiques of the Socratic method (see A. Moore 2003, 505–9; Madison, III 2007; Beattie, JR. 2002, 484-494; Delić and Bećirović

2016, 515),[31] it is to be highlighted that the Socratic method should not be understood as being equal to the *ex-cathedra* teaching method. The Socratic method obliges the teacher to support and foster discussion of the subject matter and relinquish control of the learning process (see Beattie, JR. 2002, 478; Delić and Bećirović 2016, 512–15). Despite his or her undoubtedly rich knowledge and experience (critical Beattie, JR. 2002, 481–83), the teacher is just one part of the "team" (cf. Beattie, JR. 2002, 476–77). Indeed, the Socratic method is a "*strong* 'student-centered' theory of education" (Beattie, JR. 2002, 478). "[R]einforcement and support of students is an essential characteristic of Socratic inquiry," as James R. Beattie Jr. put it (Beattie, JR. 2002, 477). The constitution of a "team," however, may also place a burden on the shoulders of students, many of whom fear to be called upon, as they need to actively contribute to the teaching (see A. Moore 2003, 508–9; Beattie, JR. 2002, 476–77; see Gersen 2016, 2324–29). There is no solution to this, however. In contrast, it is the responsibility of students (who, at least in European civil law countries, benefit from a highly subsidized education system) to be actively engaged in the learning process (similar A. Moore 2003, 509–10). Societies need actively engaged members. Who else, if not the specialists in interpreting the social contract (i.e., the jurists), the very basic foundation of a society, shall be actively engaged in its matters (cf. Gersen 2016, 2341–47)?

Although, given the confines of this paper, no details of how to adapt the examination methods to this new aim of legal education can be given, the interested reader will surely have noticed the commonalities between the abilities proposed to be taught in law schools and the skills required when writing an article (or term paper). Instead of mainly focusing on the assessment of the students' plain knowledge of the body of law, examinations should test the students' understanding of the law and their skills to reflect upon it. The students may for example be asked to analyze the reasoning of a court judgment or to provide their view on new societal developments and their classification under the law (e.g., distributed ledger technology, digital currency, robo advisory). In addition, classical examination methods such as multiple-choice questions could be interwoven with the new approach to assess the students' understanding of the legal system by requesting them to provide an explanation for why they ticked a certain answer and why they believe that their answer is correct. There is no black and white solution, however; the best method will result in the adoption of a middle way, i.e.,

[31] Some of them, however, might be based on a misunderstanding of the seminal idea of the Socratic method. The Socratic method, for example, cannot be limited to a merely "case-based" teaching approach (apparently disaccord Madison, III 2007, 303; Abrams 2015, 565; accord Gersen 2016, 2342).

a mixture of different examination methods (Mendelson 1972, 322; Zander 1968, 35; Herring and Lynch 2014, 105–6; Craven-Griffiths 1984, 114).

4.5. The Impact of the New Aim of Legal Education on the Current Legal Education Triangle

If the new aim of legal education, i.e., educating good jurists, is to be pursued, the existing *ex-cathedra* teaching model focused on teaching students to know the law must be changed by revivifying the Socratic method. The Socratic method will help teach students understand the law instead of merely memorizing it through rote learning. This is not to say that knowledge of the respective jurisdiction's body of law is negligible at all. Undoubtedly, rote learning is to some extent required. However, the message which this paper tries to convey is that legal education in civil law systems should put a stronger focus on the Socratic method, i.e., teaching the students to understand the law.

The new aim of legal education and the ongoing digitalization will ultimately change the current legal education triangle. In the future, teaching law will be more interactive and strongly involve students in the teaching process on and off campus. This will lead to new challenges, especially when students are—COVID-19 as an example—physically distanced from their law teachers. Legal knowledge will no longer be primarily accessible on campus as knowledge repositories will be available online. The university facilities' main purpose will be to provide a public working and collaboration space allowing students and researchers to engage in real face-to-face discourses and to exchange their ideas with peers. Exams will increasingly focus on assessing the students' (holistic) understanding of the law. The assessment of memorized legal knowledge will fade into the background. Overall, the law universities will maintain their importance. They will no longer be substituted by online knowledge repositories because they teach the understanding of the law, which cannot be acquired by rote learning but in an interactive learning process.

Conclusion

COVID-19 has challenged the traditional legal education triangle in many ways and thereby given us the chance to reconsider the current legal education system. Although not a few have been eager to return to the status quo as soon as possible, COVID-19 provides cause to question why law is taught at all, what is being taught and how law is being taught. Despite the horrendous effect of this infectious disease on people's health, it has the

following positive legacy: COVID-19 has further boosted digitalization in the context of legal education, as it has physically disconnected law students from law teachers. In addition, COVID-19 has helped to make legal knowledge more accessible beyond the campus, as universities have been forced to grant enhanced access to online research tools. Examination methods have been altered as well, suddenly requiring students not only to reproduce legal knowledge but also to reflect on it. COVID-19 demonstrates that rote legal knowledge, mere knowledge reproducing activities and repetitive processes, will continue to lose value (cf. Anzinger 2020, 1). Universities have had to come up with an education model that reflects these changes. The new model should aim to teach students to understand the legal system from a holistic perspective by applying the Socratic model. This requires a paradigm shift in civil law jurisdictions' legal education, a paradigm shift which will ultimately be for the benefit of the legal education and the jurisprudence.

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Appendices

Table 1. The Aim of Legal Education in Civil Law Countries[32]

University (Nation)	Aim[33]
University of Lucerne (Switzerland)	Teaching the methodical and professional knowledge ensuring to capably and responsibly practice law[34]
University of Bern (Switzerland)	Teaching (in-depth) knowledge (with technical focuses) and communicative, methodological, and linguistic skills that are required for practicing all legal professions[35]
University of Zurich (Switzerland)	Teaching in-depth knowledge and the ability to think methodically and scientifically as well as to carry out independent scientific and practical work[36]
University of Basel (Switzerland)	N/A[37]
University of Freiburg (Switzerland)	N/A[38]
University of St. Gallen (Switzerland)	N/A[39]
University of Geneva (Switzerland)	N/A[40]
Ludwig-Maximilians-University Munich (Germany)	Teaching the understanding and application of the law and necessary knowledge in the examination subjects[41]

[32] To enhance the readability of the table, the references to the laws, ordinances and regulations consulted for the composition of the table are provided for in the following footnotes.
[33] Some universities differentiate between the aims of legal education at the level of bachelor and master studies. This paper does not make this differentiation as it takes a holistic stance with regard to the overall legal education.
[34] Universitätsrat der Universität Luzern 2016, §§ 7 and 16.
[35] Rechtswissenschaftliche Fakultät der Universität Bern 2014, arts. 10, 13 and 20.
[36] Universitätsrat der Universität Zürich 2012, §§ 12 and 18.
[37] Juristische Fakultät der Universität Basel 2011a, 2011b.
[38] Fakultätsrat der Rechtswissenschaftlichen Fakultät der Universität Freiburg 2018.
[39] The University of St. Gallen does not provide for a specific aim of the legal education offered by it (Universitätsrat der Universität St. Gallen 2019, 2020).
[40] Conseil de Faculté de droit de l'Université de Genève 2018.
[41] Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität München 2012, § 2.

University of Cologne (Germany)	Teaching skills and knowledge required for legal preparatory service and for the exercise of legal activities (particularly for the office of judge and for higher general administrative service). Enabling students to conduct in-depth academic work and to independently explore new developments, as well as to think critically and act responsibly. Deepening the understanding of economic and political relations, of the philosophical, historical, and social foundations and of the methods of jurisprudence.[42]
Humboldt University of Berlin (Germany)	Teaching skills and knowledge (including specialist knowledge) essential for the practice of legal professions. Enabling students to conduct academic work, to think critically, to act responsibly and to be able to answer legal questions.[43]
Rheinische Friedrich-Wilhelms University Bonn (Germany)	Teaching legal knowledge and the ability to deal with the law scientifically.[44]
University of Wien (Austria)	N/A[45]
Paris Lodron University Salzburg (Austria)	Teaching thinking, argumentation and expressiveness, judgement, ability to work in a team, critical legal awareness and social competence and enabling graduates as "generalists" to work in various professions.[46]
Leiden University (Netherlands)	N/A[47]
Université de Lille (France)	N/A[48]
Université de Toulon (France)	N/A[49]
Université Savoie Mont Blanc	N/A[50]

The Aim of Legal Education Stipulated in Study Regulations by Universities in Civil Law Countries

[42] Rechtswissenschaftliche Fakultät der Universität zu Köln 2018, § 1.
[43] Juristische Fakultät der Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin 2015a, § 4 (1).
[44] Rheinische Friedrich-Wilhelms-Universität Bonn 2015, § 1.
[45] No relevant document could be found.
[46] Paris Lodron-Universität Salzburg 2019, § 1.
[47] The regulations of the Law School of Leiden University do not stipulate a particular aim of the legal education. However, it has to be noted that only the regulations concerning the master of laws (Leiden Law School Leiden University 2020) were accessible and not those regarding the bachelor of laws.
[48] Faculté des Sciences Juridiques, Politique et Sociales, Université de Lille 2017, 2019a, 2019b.
[49] Université de Toulon UFR Faculté de Droit 2018.
[50] Faculté de Droit, Université Savoie Mont Blanc, n.d.

Table 2. Examination Methods in Legal Education in Civil Law Countries[51]

University (Nation)	Examination Method[52]
University of Lucerne (Switzerland)	Written or oral exams; Written works; and Moot courts.[53]
University of Bern (Switzerland)	Written or oral exams; Written works; Seminars (written work and oral presentation); and Moot court or legal clinics.[54]
University of Zurich (Switzerland)	Written or oral exams; Written works; Oral presentations; and Moot courts or participation in e-learning courses.[55]
University of Basel (Switzerland)	Written or oral exams; Written works; Seminars; and Moot courts.[56]
University of Freiburg (Switzerland)	Written or oral exams; and Written works.[57]
University of St. Gallen (Switzerland)	Written or oral exams; and Written works.[58]
University of Geneva (Switzerland)	Written or oral exams; Written works; and Moot courts or legal clinics.[59]

[51] To enhance the readability of the table, the references to the laws, ordinances and regulations consulted for the composition of the table are provided for in the following footnotes.

[52] Some universities differentiate between the aims of legal education at the level of bachelor and master studies. This paper does not make this differentiation as it takes a holistic stance with regard to the overall legal education.

[53] Universität Luzern 2016, § 2(1)(a)-(b).

[54] Rechtswissenschaftliche Fakultät der Universität Bern 2014, Art. 12 Abs. 1 and Art. 25 Abs. 1.

[55] Universitätsrat der Universität Zürich 2012, § 26 Abs. 1.

[56] Juristische Fakultät der Universität Basel 2011a, Art. 9 Abs. 1-2 and Art. 23, 2011b, § 8 Abs. 2.

[57] Fakultätsrat der Rechtswissenschaftlichen Fakultät der Universität Freiburg 2018, Art. 2 Abs. 1 and Art. 15.

[58] Universitätsrat der Universität St. Gallen 2019, Art. 21 Abs. 1, 2020, Art. 23 Abs. 1.

[59] Conseil de Faculté de droit de l'Université de Genève 2018, Art. 16 and Art. 33.

Ludwig-Maximilians-University Munich (Germany)	Written exams; and Seminars (written work and oral presentation).[60]
University of Cologne (Germany)	Written exams; Written works; and Seminars or moot courts.[61]
Humboldt University of Berlin (Germany)	Written and oral exams; and Written works.[62]
Rheinische Friedrich-Wilhelms University Bonn (Germany)	Written or oral exams; Presentations; and Written works.[63]
University of Wien (Austria)	Written or oral exams; and Written works.[64]
Paris Lodron University Salzburg (Austria)	Written or oral exams; and Written works.[65]
Leiden University (Netherlands)	Written or oral exams; and Written works[66]
Université de Lille (France)	Written or oral exams.[67]
Université de Toulon (France)	Written or oral exams.[68]
Université Savoie Mont Blanc	Written or oral exams; Written works; Presentations; and Projects.[69]

Examination Methods in Legal Education in Civil Law Countries

[60] Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität München 2012, § 18-19.
[61] Rechtswissenschaftliche Fakultät der Universität zu Köln 2018, § 12.
[62] Juristische Fakultät der Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin 2015a, 2015b.
[63] Rheinische Friedrich-Wilhelms-Universität Bonn, n.d., § 13(3).
[64] Universität Wien 2017.
[65] Paris Lodron-Universität Salzburg 2019, § 12 - 14, 18.
[66] University Leiden Law School 2018.
[67] Faculté des Sciences Juridiques, Politique et Sociales, Université de Lille 2019a, Art. 15 and 18, 2017, 2.
[68] Université de Toulon UFR Faculté de Droit 2018, article 5.1.
[69] Université de Savoie Mont Blanc 2019, 5.